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Abstract
This paper analyzes the security of an image encryption algorithm proposed by Ye and Huang [IEEE MultiMedia, vol. 23,
pp. 64-71, 2016]. The Ye-Huang algorithm uses electrocardiography (ECG) signals to generate the initial key for a chaotic
system and applies an autoblocking method to divide a plain image into blocks of certain sizes suitable for subsequent
encryption. The designers claimed that the proposed algorithm is “strong and flexible enough for practical applications”.
In this paper, we perform a thorough analysis of their algorithm from the view point of modern cryptography. We find it is
vulnerable to the known plaintext attack: based on one pair of a known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image, an
adversary is able to derive a mask image, which can be used as an equivalent secret key to successfully decrypt other cipher-
images encrypted under the same key with a non-negligible probability of 1/256. Using this as a typical counterexample,
we summarize security defects in the design of the Ye-Huang algorithm. The lessons are generally applicable to many other
image encryption schemes.
Keywords: Known-plaintext attack, cryptanalysis, image encryption, chaotic cryptography, image privacy.
1. Introduction
Security and privacy of image data have become almost
everyone’s concern as sharing and enjoying photos on
social media are a part of our daily lives nowadays, which
is strongly supported by human’s complex emotional
needs, e.g., narcissism, popularity and belongingness. To
cope with the challenges, a great number of image
encryption and privacy protection schemes were proposed
to conceal important information about the original image
data from the unintended viewers [1, 2, 3]. The complex
dynamics of chaotic maps demonstrated in an
infinite-precision world are similar to the required
properties of a secure encryption system initially
summarized by Shannon, the father of information theory,
in the late 1940s [4, Table 1]. The similarity attracts many
security researchers to utilize various chaotic systems and
methodologies for all kinds of cryptographic applications,
including image encryption, video encryption, image
privacy protection, public key infrastructure and hash.
Some biometric personal features, e.g. fingerprint, iris, and
∗Corresponding author.
Email address: DrChengqingLi@gmail.com (Chengqing Li)
electrocardiography (ECG) signals, are used for
identification and cryptography in various application
scenarios, e.g. Internet of Things [5].
ECG records electrical changes of the skin arising from
the heart muscle’s electrophysiologic patterns of
depolarization and repolarization during each heartbeat.
The dynamic properties of the time series of ECG,
measured by the 2D degree distribution of the
corresponding complex networks, can be used as a tool to
identify healthy persons from pathological groups. In
different cryptographic scenarios, the ECG signal is used
for various purposes. In [6], its characteristics in Fourier
domain are used as a key for realizing secure
communication and hash-based authentication among
sensor nodes in a body area sensor networks (BANs). To
assure an ECG signal is securely transmitted in BANs, it is
first compressed with a compression algorithm called
SPIHT (set partitioning in hierarchical trees) and then a
small portion of important coefficients in the compression
domain are encrypted using a well-known modern cipher
[7]. The importance of the compression coefficients is
evaluated in terms of their influence strength on
decompression. To keep a patient’s ECG information
private in an automatic online diagnosis system identifying
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six possible states of heart beat, four feature coefficients of
the ECG signal are extracted and encrypted by a
homomorphic encryption scheme before transmission to
the system [8]. In [9], a feature extraction technique of
ECG is proposed to accurately authenticate whether two
ECG signals belong to the same person.
In [10], a personalized information encryption scheme
using ECG signals with chaotic functions was proposed.
In this scheme, the Lyapunov exponent of an ECG signal
is used as the initial states of two pseudorandom number
generators composed of a logistic map and a Henon map,
respectively. As selection of chaotic map is a core step in
the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem, some unimodal
maps like logistic map can weaken security of the
supported cryptosystem [11]. In addition, dynamics of any
chaotic map in the digital domain are degenerated and may
seriously influence the security of the supporting
encryption function [12, 13]. The paper [10] skipped the
problem and did not provide any information on the
concrete functions used for diffusion and confusion, which
violates some basic design principles summarized in [4].
To improve the scheme proposed in [10], Ye and Huang
proposed an image encryption algorithm based on
autoblocking and electrocardiography (IEAE) in [14].
Their method is to use an ECG signal to generate the
initial keys to control the whole encryption process
composed of block-wise matrix multiplications. This
paper re-evaluates the security of IEAE and we find that
IEAE is susceptible to a known-plaintext attack. In
addition, the security defects in IEAE are summarized,
along with lessons for avoiding similar pitfalls in the
design of image encryption schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a description of IEAE. Detailed cryptanalytic
results on IEAE are given in Section 3. The last section
concludes the paper.
2. Image encryption algorithm based on autoblocking
and electrocardiography (IEAE)
The encryption object of IEAE is a gray-scale image of
size M × N, denoted by I = {Ii, j}M,Ni=1, j=1. The whole
plain-image is divided into blocks of size p1 × p2 and is
encrypted blockwise by IEAE. Let C denotes the
corresponding cipher-image. Then, the basic parts of
IEAE can be described as follows.
• The secret key: non-negative integers ω1, ω2, µ1, µ2 used
for array indexes; control parameter of Logistic map
xn = µ · xn−1 · (1 − xn−1), (1)
µ ∈ [3.9, 4]; positive integer control parameters of
generalized Arnold map(
xn+1
yn+1
)
=
(
1 a
b 1 + a · b
)
·
(
xn
yn
)
mod 1, (2)
a and b, where (x mod n) = x − n · bx/nc.
• Public parameter: iteration number R.
• Initialization:
1) Given an ECG signal Z = {zi}Li=1, its largest Lyapunov
exponent, λ, is calculated by Wolf’s algorithm proposed
in [15]:
– Step 1: Transform the signal Z into a sequence in an
m-dimensional phase space, Y = {Yi}L∗i=1, where
Yi = [z(i−1)m+1, z(i−1)m+2, · · · , z(i−1)m+m],
L∗ = bL/mc. Initialize indexes k = 1 and tk = 1.
– Step 2: Calculate the distance
Lk = ‖Ytk − Yt′k‖,
where Yt′k is the directional nearest neighbor point of
Ytk in the phase space, and the angle between
−−−−−→
YtkYt′k−1
and
−−−→
YtkYt′k , θ, is smaller than 30
◦ when k > 1.
– Step 3: As the evolution and replacement procedure
depicted in Fig. 1, incrementally increase the values
of tk and t′k at the same time until the distance between
Ytk and Yt′k is larger than the threshold value . Then,
set their current distance as L′k, k = k+1, and tk = tk−1.
– Step 4: Repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until tk > L∗.
– Step 5: Calculate the largest Lyapunov exponent
λ =
1
tk − 1
q∑
k=1
log2
(
L′k
Lk
)
, (3)
where q is the total number of the replacement steps.
2L
3L
1t 2
t
1L
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1
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4t
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the evolution and
replacement procedure estimating the largest Lyapunov exponent
from a phase space.
2
2) Iterate Eq. (1) P steps from initial condition
x¯0 = Rem(|λ| · 108) with the control parameter µ and
obtain integer sequence {x¯1, x¯2, · · · , x¯P} via the
conversion function
f (x) =
(
x · 1014
)
mod 256, (4)
where P = (p1 · p2) + 256, and Rem(x) returns the
fractional part of x.
3) Iterate Eq. (2) Q steps from
(x0, y0) = (|λ|,Rem(|λ| · 105)) and assign the obtained
sequence {xr+1, yr+1, xr+2, yr+2, · · · xr+MN/2, yr+MN/2}
converted by Eq. (4) into M × N matrix D in the raster
order, where r = x¯µ1 , and Q = r + MN/2.
4) Assign sequence {x¯µ3 , x¯µ3+1, · · · x¯µ3+p1·p2 } into p1 × p2
matrix C0 in the raster order, where
µ3 =
 p1,p2∑
i=1, j=1
Ii, j
 mod 256 + 1, (5)
• The encryption procedure:
– Step 1: Divide I and D into r1 · r2 sub-blocks of size
p1 × p2, which is automatically selected from a fixed
look-up table via random entries. Table 1 shows the
table used for plain-images of size 256 × 256. In this
case, indexesq1 = bx¯ω1 · 1014c mod 3,q2 = bx¯ω2 · 1014c mod 3. (6)
For example, the block size is set as (p1, p2) = (8, 16)
if (q1, q2) = (0, 1). If p1 - M or p2 - N, some zero
pixels are padded to the plain-image to make equations
M = r1 · p1 and N = r2 · p2 both exist.
Table 1: Block sizes for plain-image of size 256 × 256.
HHHHHq1
q2 0 1 2
0 (8,8) (8,16) (8,32)
1 (16,8) (16,16) (16,32)
2 (32,8) (32,16) (32,32)
– Step 2: Encrypt the k-th block of plain-image I, Ik, by
Ck =
(Ik + v · Dk + Ck−1) mod 256 if k < r1 · r2;(Ik + Ck−1) mod 256 if k = r1 · r2,
(7)
for k = 1 ∼ (r1 · r2), where v = x¯µ2 , and Dk denotes
the k-th block divided in Step 1). To facilitate the
following description, we unify the two functions in
Eq. (7) as the same form,
Ck = (Ik + v · Dk + Ck−1) mod 256, (8)
by setting Dk ≡ 0 if k = r1 · r2.
• Step 3: Repeat the above step R times.
• The decryption procedure is the inverse version of
Eq. (8), and operates
Ik =
(Ck − v · Dk −Ck−1) mod 256 if k < r1 · r2;(Ck −Ck−1) mod 256 if k = r1 · r2,
(9)
for k = (r1 · r2) ∼ 1.
3. Cryptanalysis of IEAE
In [14], the authors claimed that “the keystream
generated is related to the plain-image, so it can effectively
resist all kinds of differential attacks.” However, we argue
that the statement is not true. Furthermore, we report the
underlying mechanisms relating to the insecurity of some
basic parts of IEAE.
3.1. Known-plaintext attack on IEAE
The known-plaintext attack is a cryptanalysis model
assuming that the attacker can access a set of plaintexts
and the corresponding ciphertexts encrypted by the same
secret key. If an encryption scheme cannot withstand
known-plaintext attack, every secret key should only be
used only once in one encryption session, which would
incur complex management of secret keys and very high
cost. According to Kerckhoffs’s principle, an encryption
algorithm should be secure even if everything about the
algorithm, except the secret key, is public knowledge,
which is reformulated by Shannon as “the enemy knows
the system”. In [14], the authors claimed that
“known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks are
infeasible for the proposed encryption algorithm” based on
the sensitivity of matrix C0 on the change of plain-images,
caused by the mechanism shown in Eq. (5). Actually, the
sensitivity mechanism is cancelled due to the modulo
addition in Eq. (5), which occurs with probability 1/256 if
every pixel in the plain-images is distributed uniformly.
Proposition 1. Given any round number R, D′ = {D′k}r1r2k=1
is the equivalent secret key of IEAE for other plain-images
generating the same value of µ3, where
D′k =
Ck −
k∑
h1=1
h1∑
h2=1
· · ·
hR−2∑
hR−1=1
k−hR−1+1∑
i=1︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
R times
Ii
 mod 256. (10)
3
Proof. Observing Eq. (8), one has
Ck = (Ik + v · Dk + Ck−1) mod 256
= (Ik + Ik−1 + v · (Dk + Dk−1) + Ck−2) mod 256
...
=
 k∑
i=1
Ii + v ·
k∑
i=1
Di + C0
 mod 256,
for any k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r1 · r2}. When R = 2 and the
relationship between Ck and Ik becomes
Ck =
 k∑
i=1
Ii + v ·
k∑
i=1
Di + C0 + v · Dk + Ck−1
 mod 256
=
 k∑
i=1
Ii + v ·
k∑
i=1
Di + C0 + v · Dk+
k−1∑
i=1
Ii + v ·
k−1∑
i=1
Di + C0 + v · Dk−1 + Ck−2
 mod 256
=
 2∑
h1=1
k−h1+1∑
i=1
Ii + v ·
2∑
h1=1
k−h1+1∑
i=1
Di + 2C0+
v ·
k∑
i=k−1
Di + · · · + I1 + v · D1 + C0
 mod 256,
=
 k∑
h1=1
k−h1+1∑
i=1
Ii + v ·
k∑
h1=1
k−h1+1∑
i=1
Di + v ·
k∑
i=1
Di + k ·C0
mod 256.
As for any value of round number R, the relationship can
be similarly derived:
Ck =

k∑
h1=1
h1∑
h2=1
· · ·
hR−2∑
hR−1=1
k−hR−1+1∑
i=1︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
R times
Ii + D′k
 mod 256, (11)
where
D′k =
v ·

k∑
h1=1
h1∑
h2=1
· · ·
hR−2∑
hR−1=1
k−hR−1+1∑
i=1︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
R times
Di
+
k∑
h1=1
h1∑
h2=1
· · ·
hR−3∑
hR−2=1
k−hR−2+1∑
i=1︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
R − 1 times
Di + · · · +
k∑
i=1
Di

+
k∑
h1=1
h1∑
h2=1
· · ·
hR−4∑
hR−3=1
k−hR−3+1∑
i=1︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
R − 2 times
i ·C0
 mod 256,
From Eq. (11), one can see that the mask image
D′ = {D′k}r1r2k=1 can work as the equivalent key of IEAE,
which completes the proof of this proposition.
Given one pair of plain-image and the corresponding
cipher-image, a mask image can be constructed as
Proposition 1, which can be used to decrypt a
cipher-image when the following two conditions hold at
the same time: 1) it is encrypted by IEAE with the same
secret key and public parameter as the given cipher-image;
2) its corresponding plain-image can generate the same
value of µ3 as the given plain-image. To check the validity
of the proposed attack, we performed a number of
experiments with some secret keys and more than 256
plain-images of size 512 × 512. When the secret key and
parameter are set as [14], namely a = 1, b = 1, ω1 = 50,
ω2 = 50, µ = 3.999, µ1 = 20, µ2 = 15, and R = 3, the
plain-image “Lenna” and its results of encryption and
decryption are shown in Fig. 2a), b), and c), respectively.
A number of cipher-images encrypted with the same secret
key as that of Fig. 2b) were decrypted by using the
equivalent secret key obtained by the above attack, which
is shown in Fig. 2e). Among them, the cipher-image
shown in Fig. 2d) was successfully decrypted since the
corresponding plain-image shown in Fig. 2f) can generate
the same µ3 as the plain-image “Lenna” by Eq. (5).
3.2. Security defects of IEAE
Using IEAE as a representative example, we analyze
here the underlying mechanisms for its security defects,
which also exist in many other image encryption schemes.
• The real structure of Logistic map in digital computer
In a finite-precision digital computer, dynamics of any
chaotic maps satisfying a well-known chaos definition
4
a) b) c)
d) e) f)
Figure 2: The results of IEAE cryptosystem and the proposed
known-plaintext attack method: a) “Lenna”; b) encrypted
“Lenna”; c) decrypted “Lenna”; d) encrypted “Baboon” with the
same secret key; e) mask image D′; f) the breaking result of the
encrypted “Baboon.”
in the infinite domain will definitely be degraded.
Reliability of numerical solution of some chaotic
dynamical systems is questionable [16]. Given an
arithmetical domain (all possible representable
numbers) and a rounding method, the functional graph
of a chaotic map is determined. Just as [14, Fig. 1], a
great number of research papers use the change trend of
the positive Lyapunov exponent of digital chaotic maps
with respect to control parameters to demonstrate
complex degree of their dynamics. The metric only
measures the maps from the macroscopic perspective.
Actually, the calculated Lyapunov exponent in the
digital domain is the change trend of the underlying
functional graph along some evolution orbits (paths).
So, some subtle properties of the digital chaotic map are
omitted [17], such as short period cycles. To show this
point, Fig. 3 depicts the functional graph of Logistic
map with µ = 61/24 in the arithmetic domain
{0, 1, 2, · · · , 26} under three quantization methods. Some
small-sized connected components are omitted with a
relatively high probability, which may lead to security
defects of the supported system. Note that the structure
of the functional graph of Logistic map implemented in
a high precision is very similar to that in a lower
precision [17]. Figure 4 presents the functional graph of
Logistic map in a 9-bit floating-precision domain.
• Low efficiency of the method generating PRNS
In the field of image encryption, many schemes use
fn(x) = f (10m · x) mod D (12)
to convert a floating-point number into an n-bit integer
number, where f (x) is a quantization function, e.g. ceil,
and floor. In computer, complexity of multiplication of
two s-bit binary numbers is O(sα), where α ∈ (1.35, 2]
depending on the specific multiplication algorithm, e.g.,
Booth’s algorithm and Karatsuba algorithm. As
10m =
(
2 · (22 + 1)
)m
=
m∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
· 23m−2i,
the number of “1” in the binary representation of 10m,
n0, is largely proportional to m. In a machine adopting
the “shift and add” algorithm, the computational
complexity is proportional to n0. Figure 5 depicts how
the binary length of 10m, dlog2(10m)e = dm log2(10)e,
and n0 changes with respect to m when m ∈ [1, 50]. As
for Eq. (4) and Eq. (6), one has m = 14, n0 = 17, and
only the eight and two least significant bits are adopted,
respectively. So, computations on most computed bits
are wasted.
• Period behavior of the generalized Arnold map
In e-bit fixed-precision arithmetical domain, Eq. (2) is
equivalent to(
x′n+1
y′n+1
)
=
(
1 a′
b′ 1 + a′ · b′
)
·
(
x′n
y′n
)
mod 2e, (13)
where a′ = a mod 2e, b′ = b mod 2e, x′n = bxn · 2ec,
and y′n = byn · 2ec. To visualize the real structure of the
generalized Arnold map, we depict its functional graph
with two sets of parameters in Fig. 6, where the number
in each node denotes
zn = x′n + (y
′
n · 2e),
and e = 4. The whole graph shown in Fig. 6a) is
composed of 8 connected components (CC) of period
16, 8 CC of period 8, 8 CC of period 4, 11 CC of period
2, and 8 self-connected nodes. So, the support of [14,
Fig. 2] on random behavior of the generalized Arnold
map is groundless. Actually, it only plots a short orbit
(path) in a connected component obtained in the digital
computer. In addition, although the maximal Lyapunov
exponent of the generalized Arnold map is positive, it is
a metric measuring the overall dynamics of a system,
which may fail to demonstrate complex dynamics
(randomness) of the system in a local domain.
• Incapability of the test metrics adopted by IEAE
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Figure 3: The functional graph of Logistic map with µ = 61/24 under 6-bit fixed-point precision for different quantization strategies: a)
floor; b) round; c) ceil, where the number i in each node denotes value i/26.
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Figure 4: The functional graph of Logistic map with µ = 123/25 under 9-bit floating-point precision, where significant digits (the
significand) and exponent both occupy 4 bits and the number i in each node denotes value i/210.
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Figure 5: The bit length of 10m and the number of “1” in its binary
presentation.
– Key Space and Sensitivity: The size of the key space
of IEAE is bounded by the number of available of
ECG signals, which incur complex burdens of secure
storage and transmission of the sensitive information
and may violate the availability principle of security
[18]. Just like the dynamics of any chaotic system are
degenerated in digital world [13], the sensitivity of
digitized ECG signals with respect to a sampled
person and time also worsens to some extents.
Furthermore, due to the addition and division in
Eq. (3), totally different ECG signals may own the
same largest Lyapunov exponent. So, the statement in
[14], “ECG is like a one-time keypad–different
people will have different ECGs, so the keys will not
be used twice”, is questionable.
– Histograms: As shown in [2], an attacker cannot
efficiently obtain some meaningful information from
the uniform histogram of pixels, but can learn
important statistic information about the plain-image
from the histogram of bits. So, changing the objects
of histogram may make the statement in [14, Fig. 6]
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Figure 6: Functional graphs of generalized Arnold maps in Z24 : a) a′ = 7, b′ = 8; b) a′ = 12, b′ = 14.
become invalid.
– Differential Attack: Differential attack is to find
information about the secret key of an encryption
scheme by studying how differences between
plaintexts can affect the resultant difference between
the corresponding ciphertexts, which is unrelated to
the index UACI measuring how plaintext influences
the corresponding ciphertext.
– Correlation Coefficients: Weak correlation among
adjacent pixels is only a necessary (not sufficient)
condition for an invisible cipher-image, which is only
related with the capability resisting statistical analysis
from a single cipher-image. In fact, position
permutation is a sufficient way to reduce correlation
coefficients among neighbouring elements in a
plain-image [4].
– Efficiency: In [14], it is claimed that “implementing
encryption using the proposed algorithm is fast”. In
fact, the fast running speed of IEAE is built on the
simple linear encryption function by sacrificing
security. Note that the computational load spent on
direct encryption of a plain-image is proportional to
the number of plain-bytes and is unrelated with the
block size. Even worse, a substantial part of the
limited computational load of IEAE is wasted in the
processes generating pseudorandom binary
sequences. Among them, the computation of the
largest Lyapunov exponent involves very complex
operations (see Sec. 2 or [15]) and the final
computational complexity dependents on the specific
used algorithmic. Furthermore, Wolf’s method is also
very dependant on the length of the time series and in
parameters selection (i.e., the embedding dimension
and the time delay). Such a dependence could incur
differences between similar configurations in
different computers or setups, which may lead to
slightly different initial conditions of Logistic map.
For example, the same configuration for computing
logarithm in Eq. (3) has to be adopted by both secure
communication sides. All these dependency problems
erode the practicality of IEAE. To obtain a satisfying
balance between efficiency, usability, and security,
selecting some important data in the compressing
domain of a plain-image for encryption is a practical
approach.
4. Conclusion
This paper analyzed security of an image encryption
algorithm based on autoblocking and electrocardiography,
and showed that the algorithm was very weak against the
7
known-plaintext attack. Security defects in the analyzed
algorithm were summarized to inform designers of image
encryption schemes about common pitfalls and help them
improve security levels protecting image data in the
current cyberspace.
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